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EVIDENCE CORNER

Professor Cynthia Ford

“Two roads diverged in a wood, and I — I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the diference.”
− Robert Frost, “The Road Not Taken”

When Daubert is the way: The road less traveled by
his month’s subject continues with
the issue of reliability of the methodology used by experts in a specialized
ield of knowledge. In my last column,1
I discussed Montana’s approach to
admissibility of expert testimony under
M.R.E. 702. Although the federal courts
apply the Daubert2 standard to all proffered expert opinions, Montana has a
hybrid approach, and thus is more like
Robert Frost’s Vermont.3 While our
version of Evidence Rule 702 retains
its original language, the federal version has been amended several times to
relect Daubert, so that now there is a
signiicant diference between the two
current rules. Furthermore, the Montana
Supreme Court has expressly rejected
Daubert as the sole test for “non-novel”
expert testimony while endorsing it for
“novel” expert methodology.
hus, Montana lawyers dealing with
the admissibility of expert opinion face a
Frostian fork in the road. his month’s
column deals with the road less traveled
by: assessing expert testimony based
on novel methodology by the Daubert
test. he next column will identify the
much less rare types of non-novel expert
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testimony is not subject to
opinions which require diferent analythe Daubert standard and the
sis. Ater that, I will address the everDaubert test should only be used
thorny admissibility of hearsay through
to determine the admissibility
an expert. Finally, the last column on
of novel scientiic evidence.
expert testimony will circle back to the
(Emphasis added).
question of who is qualiied to opine
under Rule 702, which is an entirely
275 Mont. at 55 (1996). Two years
diferent subject from the reliability-of- ater that, the Court reiterated its rejecmethodology issue which Rule 702 and tion of Daubert as the exclusive test for
Daubert address.
admissibility of expert testimony:
he Ninth Circuit Court of
Daubert per se applies only to
Appeals, ater citing to this
novel methods
part of the Daubert decision,
As detailed in the last column, the
concluded that the requirements
Montana Supreme Court irst applied
of Daubert “apply to all
the Daubert standard to scientiic expert
profered expert testimony—
4
testimony in State v. Moore , decided
not just testimony based on
only one year ater the U.S. Supreme
novel scientiic methods or
Court Daubert decision. In Moore,
evidence.” Claar v. Burlington
where the evidence involved forensic
Northern Railroad Co. (9th
DNA analysis, the Court latly and withCir.1994), 29 F.3d 499, 501 n. 2
out qualiication, said “we, therefore,
(citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.
adopt the Daubert standard for the ad11, 113 S.Ct. at 2796 n. 11).
mission of scientiic expert testimony.”5
We disagree with this
Only four years later, in State v. Cline6,
interpretation of Daubert and
the Court took a giant step backwards,
reassert our holding in Cline that
creating two separate forks for assessing
the Daubert test should only
expert methodology:
be
used to determine the
Certainly all scientiic expert
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admissibility of novel scientiic
evidence. Cline, 275 Mont. at 55,
909 P.2d at 1177.
Hulse v. State, 289 Mont. 1, 29, 961
P.2d 75, 91 (1998).
he Court unanimously reairmed
this bifurcated approach most recently
in 2015:
¶ 21 In contrast to its status
in the federal system, Daubert
is not generally applicable in
Montana. In State v. Moore,
(1994), we observed that Daubert
was consistent with our previous
precedent “concerning the
admission of expert testimony
of novel scientiic evidence,”
and we adopted Daubert “for
the admission of scientiic
expert testimony.” Moore, 268
Mont. at 42, 885 P.2d at 471.
We later clariied, however, that
Daubert does not apply to all
expert testimony; instead, it
applies only to “novel scientiic
evidence.” State v. Cline, (1996);
see Hulse v. DOJ, Motor Vehicle
Div., (1998) (reasoning that
because “the HGN test is not
novel scientiic evidence,” a
district court “need not employ”
Daubert to determine the
admissibility of the test results).
(Emphasis added, citations
omitted).

We have adopted the various
factors set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharms., for
assessing the reliability of
profered expert testimony, but we
limit Daubert’s application to only
novel scientiic evidence. State v.
Damon, 2005 MT 218, ¶ 18, 328
Mont. 276, ¶ 18, 119 P.3d 1194, ¶
18. We assess novelty from a very
narrow perspective. Damon, ¶
18. (Citations omitted, emphasis
added).

Cline claims that because there is
no reliable scientiic procedure to
evaluate the age of a ingerprint,
Wieners’ testimony signiicantly
undermined his defense theory
that the ingerprint was laid prior
to the break-in under innocuous
circumstances unrelated to the
break-in.
… Cline argues on appeal
that the prejudicial afect [sic,
ouch] of Wieners’ testimony
outweighed the probative value
of the information. Cline further
argues that Wieners’ testimony
did not meet the criteria for the
introduction of scientiic evidence
in criminal cases.

State v. Clark, 2008 MT 419, ¶ 42.7
In fact, ater reading my way through a
myriad, if not all,8 the relevant Montana
cases, I have concluded that in fact
“very narrow” equals only one “novel”
275 Mont. at 54.
technique: narrow, indeed. I will provide
On appeal, the Supreme Court dismore detail about what that novel tech- tinguished between the two ingerprint
nique is, but irst will discuss how the
issues in the case, holding only the aging
line is drawn.
technique to be novel, thus requiring a
Daubert analysis:

Drawing the line: Novel or not?

It must also be noted that we
he irst case to draw a line between
do not consider ingerprint
“novel” and “non-novel” methods was
evidence in general to be novel
the same case which established the
scientiic evidence. However,
split analysis, Cline. Shawn Cline was
in the present case the issue
convicted of robbery, burglary and asis whether it is possible to
sault based on a break-in at the Kountry
9
determine the age of a ingerprint
Korner Cafe west of Bozeman. Part of
utilizing magnetic powder. We
the evidence admitted against him was
apply the Daubert standard to
a ingerprint of his right thumb, located
this case because we consider
on an envelope in the cafe’s money
ingerprint aging techniques
drawer. Cline explained this ingerprint
McClue v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Illinois,
in this context to be novel
with two alternative theories: that he
2015 MT 222, ¶ 21, 380 Mont. 204, 210, had worked at the café about a year
scientiic evidence. Certainly all
354 P.3d 604, 609.
scientiic expert testimony is not
before the break-in (so his ingerprint
hus, the key question for Montana
subject to the Daubert standard
stemmed from that time), and that
litigators, whether ofering or objecting shortly before the burglary, he had given
and the Daubert test should
to expert testimony, is whether the sub- an envelope to his sister-in-law who still
only be used to determine the
ject of that testimony is “novel scientiic worked at the café. (She testiied that he
admissibility of novel scientiic
evidence” or not. he only way to divine had never given her any envelope; the
evidence.
which side of the “novel” line, and thus
café manager testiied that Cline had
275 Mont. at 55. Unfortunately,
which road (Daubert or not-Daubert)
never had access to the till during his
the Cline Court did not explain how it
to travel, is to sit through the Montana employment). At trial,
reached its conclusion that ingerprint
cases. I have attempted to do that in this
aging was novel scientiic evidence while
the District Court allowed Michael
and the next column.
ingerprint identiication was not.
Wieners, a FBI ingerprint
Later cases demonstrate that the two
‘Novel’ methodology is ‘the road
technician, to testify as to the
factors
which matter most to the Court
age of Cline’s ingerprint found
less traveled by’
in
deciding
whether a particular method
on the pie tin deposit envelope.
he Bible observes that “there is no
are novel or not are its scientiic hisWieners testiied that “I think this
new thing under the sun.” Ecclesiastes,
tory and its prior use in courts both in
is
a
fresh
latent
print
probably
1:9. he Montana Supreme Court does
Montana and around the country. In
about
a
month
or
two
old.
But,
not go quite that far, but close. As the
2003, the Court stated (out loud) that
again, there is leeway either way.”
Court itself has stated:
WWW.MONTANABAR.ORG
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“there is no set standard for determining was not novel so that Daubert did not
whether a scientiic technique is novel,” apply:
but went on to identify some factors
Applying those standards here, we
which seem to matter:
conclude that the LR is not a novel
¶ 38 In Hulse, we concluded that
scientiic technique.
the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus
¶ 41 First, according to Dr. Basten,
(HGN) test was not novel
the widely used paternity statistic
scientiic evidence, noting that for
known as “paternity index” or
several decades, law enforcement
“probabilities of paternity” is
oicials had used the HGN test,
basically the same thing as a
and that as early as 1986, the
“likelihood ratio.” A “paternity
admissibility of the HGN test
index” calculation considers the
had been considered in other
genetic evidence from a mother,
jurisdictions. We cited with
child, and putative father and
approval the Minnesota Supreme
compares the hypothesis that
Court comment that “the HGN
the putative father is the father
test ‘can hardly be characterized as
versus the hypothesis that another
an emerging scientiic technique’
man is the father. According to
because nystagmus has long been
Dr. Basten, while the speciic
known and the tests have been in
equations might be slightly
common medical use for many
diferent between a paternity
years.” Hulse, ¶ 68 (citing State
index (dealing with mother, child,
v. Klawitter (Minn.1994), 518
and putative father) and the LR in
N.W.2d 577, 584).
a criminal investigation (suspect,
victim and evidence stain), both
¶ 39 Likewise, we concluded in
involve the same theory: “you’re
Southern that microscopic hair
calculating the probability of what
comparison evidence was not
you see, evidence or data, given
novel scientiic evidence—noting
diferent ideas as to how it came
that since 1978 we had considered
about.”
several cases wherein witnesses
had testiied on such evidence and
¶ 42 In State v. Weeks, the State
that comparing hair samples with
presented statistical analysis based
a microscope had been done for
on a paternity test to prove the
decades — and therefore Daubert
defendant had sexual intercourse
standards were not applicable
without consent with his thirteento determine its admissibility.
year old stepdaughter who became
Southern, ¶ 59.
impregnated. Weeks (1995), 270
Mont. 63, 891 P.2d 477 (he
¶ 40 While it is clear from our
statistical analysis determined
prior decisions that there is no
the defendant was 154,000 times
set standard for determining
more likely to be the father of his
whether a scientiic technique
stepdaughter’s baby). Dr. Basten,
is “novel,” we have consistently
having reviewed Weeks, explained
given credence not only to
that the paternity index used in
previous treatment of the
that case was basically a LR.
technique by other cases and
jurisdictions, but also to how
¶ 43 During the pre-trial hearing,
long the technique or theory
Dr. Basten told the court that in
has been used in the scientiic
at least six previous cases, his
community. (Emphasis added).
testimony was based on the LR,
including a Montana case tried
State v. Ayers, 2003 MT 114, ¶¶
in 1998, State v. Swan, Fourth
10
38-40.
Judicial District Court, Missoula
In Ayers, the State efectively used its
County, Cause No. 12594 (neither
expert to convince the trial judge, and
the admission of DNA evidence,
ultimately the Supreme Court, that the
nor the LR were appealed in that
“Likelihood [of paternity] Ratio” (“LR”)
16
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case). Moreover, Dr. Basten also
testiied in Garcia, 197 Ariz. 79,
3 P.3d 999, where the Arizona
Supreme Court concluded that
interpretation of mixed DNA
samples using statistical formulas
for calculating LR’s were generally
accepted by the relevant scientiic
community and were therefore
admissible under Frye v. United
States (D.C.Cir.1923), 293 F. 1013.
¶ 44 Second, we take note of many
journal articles written on the
topic of presenting DNA results
which incorporate discussion
of the LR. See, e.g., Jonathan
J. Koehler, On Conveying
the Probative Value of DNA
Evidence: Frequencies, Likelihood
Ratios, and Error Rates, 67 U.
Colo. L.Rev. 859 (1996); William
C. hompson, DNA Evidence
in the O.J. Simpson Trial, 67 U.
Colo. L.Rev. 827, 828 (1996);
Jonathan J. Koehler, Why DNA
Likelihood Ratios Should Account
for Error (Even When A National
Research Council Report Says
hey Should Not), 37 Jurimetrics
J. 425 (1997). (Emphasis added).
State v. Ayers, 2003 MT 114, ¶¶
40-44.
In State v. Bowman11, the court held
that an expert’s opinion on the cause of
death of an allegedly poached elk was
not based on novel science, even though
only one laboratory in the world (where
he worked) studied wildlife forensics:
he study of animal anatomy is
not a new concept. It coincides
with the study of human anatomy
and can be dated back to, at the
very least, Hippocrates (377–460
B.C.). In addition, schools of
veterinary science date back to the
mid-18th Century in Europe and
about the time of the Civil War in
America.
¶ 40 Aside from the lengthy
history surrounding the study
of animal anatomy and the
development of veterinary
schools, Stroud's education, his
studies, and his work experience,
in the area to which he testiied,
WWW.MONTANABAR.ORG

is extensive. His education
includes a Doctor of Veterinary
Medicine and a Master of
Science in veterinary science
pathology. In addition, Stroud
has participated in one study,
involving seals, where numerous
bullet wounds were observed and
another study involving deer, “[t]
hat was speciically to determine
wound ballistic characterization
using various irearms.” Further,
at the Lab he “primarily deal[s]
with either cause of death
or pathologic examination
of evidence from wildlife ...
[including] birds, eagles, hawks,
owls, waterfowl, wolves, deer,
elk, marine mammals, even ish.”
Lastly, he has completed about
10,000 necropsies, or autopsies,
on wildlife ranging from whales
to elk, deer, wolves, and many
diferent birds.

was “novel” at the time one case was
decided, requiring a Daubert analysis,
may eventually ripen into “non-novel”
once that method has met the Daubert
standard repeatedly. A party who wants
to use ingerprint aging, for example,
could research both the current scientiic literature and other case law across
the country to see what has happened
to the technique in the 14 years since
Cline. If lots of scientists or courts have
approved the technique in the interim,
a proponent could use those facts to escape Cline and Daubert. (FYI: I did do a
quick literature check in October 2018,
and it seems that ingerprint aging still
would be considered “novel,” requiring
a Daubert analysis.14
12
State v. Damon, 2005 MT 218, ¶ 23.
All the other cases I have seen
The List? 13 of novel methodologies categorize the methodologies involved
as “non-novel,” so that Daubert does
in Montana
not
govern their admissibility. Instead,
OK, here is the breaking news, at
what
I have dubbed the “Montana test”
last. here is only one expert methodology that the Montana Supreme Court so applies, but that is not without its own
far has held to be “novel,” requiring the diiculty, as we will see next month.
application of Daubert per se:
represents nothing new or novel.
he instrument itself has existed
since the 1970’s. An Austrian
scientist initially discovered
the fuel cell technology used in
the Alco–Sensor III PBT in the
1960s. We held in Southern that
microscopic hair comparison was
not novel because hair sampling
with a microscope had been
done for decades. Southern. ¶
59. Likewise, a PBT or PAST
using fuel cell technology does
not represent a novel scientiic
technique that requires a court
to apply the Daubert factors.
(Emphasis added).

2004 MT 119, ¶¶ 39-40. Although
there is “no set standard for determining whether a scientiic technique is
1. Fingerprint identiication
‘novel,’” a synthesis of these cases shows
(Cline):
that to successfully argue for the appliIt must also be noted that we
cation of Daubert, the opponent should
do not consider ingerprint
show both that the expert’s methodolevidence in general to be novel
ogy is recent in origin, and that it has
scientiic evidence. However,
not been used in very many, if any,
in the present case the issue
court cases.
is whether it is possible to
he obvious caveat is that the opdetermine the age of a ingerprint
ponent urging a Daubert analysis should
utilizing magnetic powder. We
not agree that the contested methodolapply the Daubert standard to
ogy is not novel. Sadly, that is exactly
this case because we consider
what sabotaged the argument in Damon
ingerprint aging techniques
v. State. Damon involved a PBT,
in this context to be novel
also known as a Preliminary Alcohol
scientiic evidence. Certainly all
Screening Test (PAST), that revealed
scientiic expert testimony is not
defendant’s blood alcohol content
subject to the Daubert standard
(BAC) to be 0.274. Ater a pretrial hearand the Daubert test should
ing on the admissibility of the PBT, the
only be used to determine the
judge allowed it into evidence at trial.
admissibility of novel scientiic
Damon was convicted and designated a
evidence.
persistent felony ofender. On appeal,
State v. Cline, 275 Mont. 46, 55, 909
he challenged the reliability of the test
P.2d 1171, 1177 (1996). Of course, as
and its admission. he Supreme Court
new methodologies are developed and
observed that:
ofered in Montana cases for the irst
¶ 23 Both parties in this
time, they too may be deemed “novel”
case admit that the scientiic
and the suggestions below would apply
technology used in the Alco–
to them as well as to ingerprint agSensor III to measure alcohol
ing. he converse is also true: what
18
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How to use Daubert in a “novel
method” case

In Cline, the Montana Supreme
Court referred back to Moore15, the
case in which it originally had held that
Daubert applied in Montana state court,
as guidance for trial lawyers and judges:
We noted that Rule 702,
Fed.R.Evid., still requires the
district court to screen such
evidence to ensure that any and
all scientiic testimony or evidence
admitted is not only relevant, but
reliable. Moore, 885 P.2d at 470.
To guide the trial court’s
assessment of the reliability of
the scientiic evidence ofered, we
adopted in Moore the following
four nonexclusive factors: (a)
whether the theory or technique
can be and has been tested; (b)
whether the theory or technique
has been subjected to peer review
and publication; (c) the known or
potential rate of error in using a
particular scientiic technique and
the existence and maintenance
of standards controlling the
technique’s operation; and (d)

WWW.MONTANABAR.ORG

whether the theory or technique
has been generally accepted or
rejected in the particular scientiic
ield. Moore, 885 P.2d at 47071 (citing Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at
2796-97).
State v. Cline, 275 Mont. at 55–56.
hese four factors come directly from
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Daubert:
Faced with a profer of expert
scientiic testimony, then, the
trial judge must determine at the
outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a),
whether the expert is proposing
to testify to (1) scientiic
knowledge that (2) will assist
the trier of fact to understand or
determine a fact in issue. his
entails a preliminary assessment
of whether the reasoning or
methodology underlying the
testimony is scientiically valid
and of whether that reasoning
or methodology properly can be
applied to the facts in issue. We
are conident that federal judges
possess the capacity to undertake
this review. Many factors will
bear on the inquiry, and we do
not presume to set out a deinitive
checklist or test. But some general
observations are appropriate.
Ordinarily, a key question to be
answered in determining whether
a theory or technique is scientiic
knowledge that will assist the trier
of fact will be whether it can be
(and has been) tested….
Another pertinent consideration
is whether the theory or technique
has been subjected to peer review
and publication….
Additionally, in the case of a
particular scientiic technique,
the court ordinarily should
consider the known or potential
rate of error, … and the existence
and maintenance of standards
controlling the technique’s
operation…
Finally, “general acceptance”
can yet have a bearing on the
inquiry…
he inquiry envisioned by Rule
WWW.MONTANABAR.ORG

702 is, we emphasize, a lexible
one. Its overarching subject is
the scientiic validity and thus
the evidentiary relevance and
reliability—of the principles
that underlie a proposed
submission. he focus, of course,
must be solely on principles
and methodology, not on the
conclusions that they generate.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 593–95 (1993).
It is possible to satisfy Daubert without expressly addressing each of these
factors. In Cline, where the Montana
Supreme Court held that the ingerprint
aging opinion was based on “novel
scientiic evidence,” requiring Daubert,
it airmed the admission of the evidence even though Judge Olson had not
expressly applied Daubert:
In this case, the State established
the necessary foundation
regarding the issue of determining
the age of ingerprints. Wieners
referenced and quoted a
number of scientiic treatises
on ingerprint technology. he
treatises established that while
the age of a latent print cannot
be established with complete
accuracy, experienced examiners
can profer an opinion regarding
the age of a latent print based on
the examiner’s experience and
investigation. he District Court,
although not applying the Daubert
criteria, correctly found that this
was an area where experts could
disagree, that the testimony would
be subject to cross-examination,
and that the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight of their
testimony should be for the jury
to decide, not the court. Rulings
on the admissibility of evidence
are let to the sound discretion of
the trial court. Moore, 885 P.2d at
471 (citing State v. Stewart (1992),
253 Mont. 475, 479, 833 P.2d
1085, 1087). We conclude that the
District Court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing Weiners’
testimony regarding the age of the
ingerprint.
275 Mont. at 56.

he best practice, however, is to
actually present evidence speciically addressed to each of the factors identiied
in Daubert and adopted by the Montana
Supreme Court in Moore and Cline.
Because most of us16, lawyers and judges
alike, came to law school without extensive scientiic or technical backgrounds
and certainly haven’t developed those
during our litigation careers, it makes
sense for each party’s expert to do this
work. Of course, the answers provided
by the proponent’s and opponent’s
experts will be contradictory, but both
should address (ideally in a “Daubert
hearing” on a motion in limine)
1. he expert’s familiarity with the
methodology behind the profered
opinion;
2. Whether that method can be
tested, and why or why not;
3. If in fact that method has been
tested;
4. he results of any testing of the
methodology;
5. Whether the technique has been
subject to peer review and publication,
explaining when and where it was published, what peer review prior to publishing occurred, and what further peer
review resulted from the publication;
6. Whether/what standards exist for
the technique’s operation, and how they
are maintained;
7. he known or potential rate of
error for the methodology;
8. he degree of acceptance of this
methodology in the ield of expertise.
I have developed this set of subjects
from the explicit factors articulated in
both Daubert and the Montana cases.
As Daubert itself recognizes, those factors are not exclusive, so an advocate
should also include any other evidence
that tends to prove or disprove the
ultimate issue: whether the technique is
reliable or not. Because of the universal
use of Daubert in the federal courts, and
its adoption by some states, there are
a host of practice articles which elaborate in much more on establishing and
challenging suicient reliability of an
expert’s methodology under Daubert.

Novel or not: Montana judges
urged to err on side of admission
he U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
NOVEMBER2018
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Daubert was meant to, and did, broaden
admissibility of expert opinions even
where the methodology was not generally accepted in the ield, which was the
requirement previously imposed by the
supplanted Frye decision. Similarly, the
Montana Supreme Court has urged the
district courts to lean on the side of admitting rather than excluding evolving
methodologies, even as the court must
guard against the clearly unreliable:
When we adopted the Daubert
test in Moore, we speciically
noted the continuing vitality of
Barmeyer as that case pertained
to the scientiic evidence. In
Barmeyer we held that “it is
better to admit relevant scientiic
evidence in the same manner as
other expert testimony and allow
its weight to be attacked by crossexamination and refutation.”
Barmeyer, 657 P.2d at 598 … In
Barmeyer, we rejected the “general
acceptance” test, holding that it
was not in conformity with the
spirit of the new rules of evidence.
(Citations omitted, emphasis
added).
Cline, 275 Mont. at 55.
In adopting the Daubert test,
we concluded that “before a
trial court admits scientiic
expert testimony, there must be
a preliminary showing that the
expert’s opinion is premised on a
reliable methodology.” Moore, 885
P.2d at 471. We noted, however,
that such an inquiry must remain
lexible.
“Not every error in the application
of a particular methodology
should warrant exclusion. An
alleged error in the application
of a reliable methodology should
provide the basis for exclusion
of the opinion only if that error
negates the basis for the reliability
of the principle itself.” Moore,
885 P.2d at 471 (quoting United
States v. Martinez (8th Cir.1993),
3 F.3d 1191, 1198).
State v. Cline, 275 Mont. at 55–56.
he Court reiterated its preference for admission of evidence even
where some question exists about the
20
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methodology or its application:
¶ 48 We have noted that
criticisms of speciic applications
of procedures or concerns about
the accuracy of test results does
“not render the scientiic theory
and methodology invalid or
destroy their general acceptance.
hese questions go to the
weight of the evidence, not the
admissibility.” Weeks, 270 Mont.
at 83, 891 P.2d at 489 (citation
omitted). Moreover, we have
consistently stated that “it is
better to admit relevant scientiic
evidence in the same manner as
other expert testimony and allow
its weight to be attacked by crossexamination and refutation.”
Southern, ¶ 50 (citing Barmeyer
v. Montana Power Co. (1983), 202
Mont. 185, 193–94, 657 P.2d 594,
598, overruled on other grounds
by Martel v. Montana Power Co.
(1988), 231 Mont. 96, 752 P.2d
140). See also, State v. Moore
(1994), 268 Mont. 20, 42–43, 885
P.2d 457, 471, overruled on other
grounds by State v. Gollehon
(1995), 274 Mont. 116, 906 P.2d
697 (even though the foundation
for the State’s expert witness was
“shaky,” the district court did
not err in ruling the defendant’s
objection to the DNA evidence
went to the weight, and not the
admissibility, of the evidence).
Finally, “[n]ot every error in
the application of a particular
methodology should warrant
exclusion. An alleged error in
the application of a reliable
methodology should provide the
basis for exclusion of the opinion
only if that error negates the basis
for the reliability of the principle
itself.” Moore, 268 Mont. at 42,
885 P.2d at 471 (citation omitted).
¶ 49 While we recognized in
Weeks, 270 Mont. at 84, 891 P.2d
at 489 *409 (citation omitted),
that “courts must be mindful
that the probative value of
statistical probabilities evidence
is not outweighed by any unfair
prejudicial efect,” we conclude

that admission of Dr. Basten’s
conclusions using the LR did not
unfairly prejudice Ayers. At both
the hearing on his motion in
limine and the trial, Ayers had the
opportunity to cross-examine Dr.
Basten concerning the computer
program he used to run the
formula, his methodology, and his
application of various sampling
error standards. While Ayers
identiied two expert witnesses at
the pre-trial hearing, Ayers chose
not to present an expert at trial to
refute or challenge Dr. Basten’s
calculations, methodology, or
formulas.
¶ 50 We conclude that the
issues concerning Dr. Basten’s
techniques/methods went to
the weight of the evidence, not
its admissibility. Based on the
foregoing, we further conclude
the District Court did not abuse
its discretion when it allowed Dr.
Basten to testify using the LR.
State v. Ayers, 2003 MT 114, ¶¶
48-50.
Hulse, the HGN case discussed
above, also contained a map for lawyers
and judges:
Certainly, if a court is presented with
an issue concerning the admissibility
of novel scientiic evidence, as was the
case in both Moore and Cline, the court
must apply the guidelines set forth
in Daubert, while adhering to the principle set forth in Barmeyer.
However, if a court is presented with
an issue concerning the admissibility of
scientiic evidence in general, the court
must employ a conventional analysis
under Rule 702, M.R.Evid., while again
adhering to the principle set forth
in Barmeyer [liberal admissibility: see
below].
Hulse v. State, Dep’t of Justice, Motor
Vehicle Div., 1998 MT 108, ¶ 63.

Fighting expert evidence which is
admitted despite its novelty
Both the U.S. and Montana Supreme
Courts have acknowledged the concerns
that the lexible Daubert standard would
allow in more expert opinions than the
stricter general-acceptance-necessary
WWW.MONTANABAR.ORG

standard which preceded Daubert.
Justice Blackmun responded directly:
Vigorous cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence,
and careful instruction on the
burden of proof are the traditional
and appropriate means of
attacking shaky but admissible
evidence. …Additionally, in the
event the trial court concludes
that the scintilla of evidence
presented supporting a position is
insuicient to allow a reasonable
juror to conclude that the
position more likely than not is
true, the court remains free to
direct a judgment, Fed.Rule Civ.
Proc. 50(a), and likewise to grant
summary judgment, Fed.Rule Civ.
Proc. 56. (Citations omitted).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993). he Montana
Supreme Court similarly endorsed

impeachment rather than wholesale
exclusion of expert testimony:

he rarity of “novel” methodology,
necessitating a straight application of
Daubert, shows that this branch of the
expert methodology trail is indeed the
road less traveled by. Although more
types of expert opinions based on
developing methodologies may be held
“novel” in the future, the only technique
which has been categorized as novel so
far is ingerprint aging.
State v. Cline, 275 Mont. at 55.
In the next column, we will explore
In the “novel” ingerprint aging
the far more numerous cases holding
context, the opposing lawyer should irst
that particular methods are not novel,
object to admission the expert’s opinion
and decide whether “that [classiication]
using the Daubert factors both in crosshas made all the diference.”
examination of the proferred expert and
in the direct of the opponent’s expert. If
Cynthia Ford teaches Civil Procedure,
the judge overrules the objection, those Evidence, Family Law, and Remedies.
She coached the Trial Team for 20
same tools should reappear at trial, as
years, and regularly serves on the facgrounds for a jury argument that the
ulty of the Advanced Trial School at the
expert’s opinion should be discounted
School of Law.
or disregarded altogether because the
methodology is “novel” and unreliable.
In Barmeyer we held that “it is
better to admit relevant scientiic
evidence in the same manner
as other expert testimony and
allow its weight to be attacked
by cross-examination and
refutation.” Barmeyer, 657 P.2d
at 598
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